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Introduction ing power, and economic wherewithal has shifted to
what can be called the central New Jersey “Wealth
Belt,” an expanding group of counties whose economic
and demographic performance is much more aligned
with the nation’s fast-growing “Sunbelt” than with the
slow-growing “Frostbelt” (which encompasses the
Northeast and Midwest regions of the country).
Hence the Wealth Belt could also be termed New
Jersey’s own Sunbelt. In a less flattering land-use/
transportation perspective, it also represents an
unprecedented degree of automobile-dependent
sprawl, congestion, and public infrastructure needs.
New Jersey’s Wealth Belt is currently defined by six
counties: Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth,
Morris, and Somerset.  This band of counties spans
the narrow midsection (or waist) of central New
Jersey between the Atlantic Ocean and the Delaware
River, with a northern-edge outcropping defined by
Morris County.  A series of central arteries form the
key growth zones and edge cities of the Wealth Belt.
It is in these corridors that the new information-age
economy has positioned itself—and toward which
maturing baby-boom housing choices are oriented.
These arteries consist of Interstate Route 287—the
metropolitan circumferential freeway centered on
New York City; Interstate Routes 80 and 78—the
major east-west freeways traversing the entire width of
the state; the Garden State Parkway—the state’s major
north-south toll road; and the New Jersey Turnpike,
Route 1, and parts of Interstate Route 295—which
define the historic corridor between New York City
and Philadelphia.
Over 200 years ago, New Jersey was described by
Benjamin Franklin as a “barrel tapped at both ends,”
wedged between the cities of New York and Philadel-
phia. Presently, the barrel is rapidly filling with
growing shares of property wealth, income, jobs, and
people.  Over 30 years ago, The New York Times, still
reflecting Franklin’s perspective, described New
Jersey as “a corridor state lost in megalopolis.”
Presently, New Jersey is no longer lost; rather its
matrix of growth zones defines one of the most potent
markets in the United States.
While the Wealth Belt defines the crest-of-the-
geographic/economic wave, the Mature Core
he New Jersey economy has continuously
reinvented itself during the past two centuries,
both structurally and spatially. Early settlements
based on water-powered manufacturing and milling
facilities scattered sparsely throughout a rural
agricultural state yielded to dense, concentrated
railroad- and steam-based urban production com-
plexes. These in turn succumbed to freeway-based
“edge cities” that shelter the new information-age
economy.  Thus, there have been spatial advances
and spatial withdrawals, as cycles of technological
innovation and industrial revolution have continu-
ously renewed the New Jersey economy.  The final
two decades of the twentieth century have seen a
vast reshaping as dramatic as that of the last two
decades of the nineteenth century, when urbaniza-
tion and city-building reigned.
This report describes the emergence of an
economic cluster of counties in New Jersey and
explains the reason for this new spatial alignment of
the economy. The report also traces the historical
shifts in the economic geography of New Jersey from
its rural beginnings to its high technology present.
Finally, the report describes the countervailing
demographic and economic initiatives that once
more may tilt growth back to urban New Jersey.  It
notes, however, that a variety of economic and public
policy challenges raise serious questions about the
outcome of the redirection of our state’s spatial
development.
ince 1980, a virtual tidal wave of economic and
demographic decentralization has reached and
engulfed the peripheries of the state’s metropolitan
regions that were historically centered on New York
City and Philadelphia.  The phenomenon has reached
its greatest intensity where New Jersey’s “suburban
rings” and “suburban edge cities” converge.  As a
result, the critical mass of the state’s wealth, purchas-
T
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Metropolis—comprising Bergen, Essex, Hudson,
Passaic, and Union counties—remains large and
strong economically, particularly its maturing suburbs.
However, the once overwhelmingly dominant core
counties have experienced a relative ebbing in their
demographic, economic, and wealth positions.  These
changes are revealed by county-based trends in broad
economic market potential (gauged by total popula-
tion and total personal income), the scale of individual
spending power (measured by per capita personal
income), overall economic potency (determined by
total employment), and property wealth (assessed by
total equalized valuation and equalized valuation per
capita). All of these indicators reveal the geography of
the new New Jersey economy as the new millennium
unfolds.
more reasonably-sized dwellings—are the shelter
of choice for baby-boom housing consumers.  The
tract houses of the 1950-to-1980 era have fallen
out of market favor, leading to new residential
forms and locations.  These new environmentally-
attractive residential locations of choice are linked
to the maturing job growth corridors within which
the new information-age economy is centered.
The key economic dynamic behind these
changes has been the latest reinvention and
retooling of the New Jersey economy.  Nationally,
the post-industrial service economy emerged with
a vengeance during the 1980s, with two key
prerequisites. First, it required the highly-
educated, highly-skilled labor force that is
normally found in metropolitan areas, and New
Jersey was ready as the most metropolitan state—
it was the only state in America with every county
a part of a metropolitan area!  Second, it required
the office inventory to shelter these workers.  And
again New Jersey was ready as a result of the
great development wave of the 1980s, when 80
percent of all of the office space ever built in the
history of the state was erected, with the majority
constructed in the growth corridors of the Wealth
Belt.  At the beginning of the 1980s, the state was
a non-player in the broad regional office market.
By 1990, the eleven counties of central-northern
New Jersey (which include the six Wealth Belt and
five Mature Core Metropolis counties) comprised
the fifth largest metropolitan office market in the
country.
Despite massive overbuilding in the office
arena in the 1980s—a harsh reality revealed by the
devastating 38-month long recession of 1989 to
1992—this new inventory was available to house
the new information-age economy of the 1990s.
This second-generation post-industrial economy
was a much more efficient, knowledge-dependent,
information-based economy, where technology
investments have finally yielded powerful produc-
tivity gains. In turn, productivity gains yielded
strong growth and low unemployment, and strong
growth yielded real income gains—all of which are
epicentered in New Jersey’s Wealth Belt.
Dynamics
T
converged to yield the New Jersey Wealth Belt.
The key demographic force is the maturing baby-
boom generation, that oversized population cohort
born between 1946 and 1964.  The largest
generation ever produced in the history of New
Jersey, the baby boom was (predominantly) born in
suburbia, reared in suburbia, ultimately chose to
live, shop, and recreate in suburbia, and now
prefers to work in suburbia.  Thus, baby-boom
choices and preferences, reinforced by economic
cost advantages, underpinned the massive
suburbanization of office space during the great
development boom of the 1980s.
As it reproduced itself—generating the baby-
boom echo—the baby boom also underpinned the
dispersed suburban/exurban housing market of the
1990s. Large-lot, family-raising, trade-up, single-
family housing now totally dominates housing
demand.  The extreme examples of the current
market edge are the new “McMansions,” 5,000
square feet and larger houses on two-acre and
larger lots, consuming enormous former greenfield
and farmland acreage.  The new “finished ma-
chines for living”—the appropriate label even for
here are a number of demographic and
economic forces and processes that have
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broader metropolitan region centered on Manhattan.
It still contains potent economic nodes and zones of
extraordinary residential affluence, but its relative
share of the state’s economy has been eroding.
Northern Exurban Fringe includes Sussex and Warren
counties, both bordering the Delaware River in the
northwest corner of the state.  Once primarily
oriented to agriculture and natural resources, they are
now highly accessible to the suburban job-growth
corridors that matured in the 1980s.  Low-density
residential use has been their most recent develop-
ment mode, tied in part to the economy of the Wealth
Belt.
New Jersey’s Wealth Belt first emerged with great eco-
nomic force during the boom years of the 1980s.
Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris,
and Somerset counties are host to one or more
highway-centered suburban employment-growth
corridors. These six counties define a key part of the
broad suburban perimeter of the metropolitan area
centered on Manhattan.  Its economic market share
has grown dramatically.
Metro South comprises three counties centered on the
City of Camden, once the manufacturing colossus of
southern New Jersey—Camden, Burlington, and
Gloucester.  This region contains a number of early
and maturing inlying suburban municipalities, as well
as the developing suburban perimeter/edge city of the
Camden-Philadelphia centered metropolitan area.  It
is home to a number of emerging highway-oriented,
job-growth corridors.
Southern Shore incorporates within it the three southeast-
ern counties of New Jersey bordering the Atlantic
Ocean: Atlantic, Cape May, and Ocean.  While the
region’s land use is heterogeneous—including a mix of
bedroom, retirement, resort, and gambling communi-
ties—its dominant orientation is the Jersey shore,
although the northern sectors are increasingly tied to
the jobs of the Wealth Belt.
Rural South consists of Cumberland and Salem counties
in the southwest part of the state. This is still a rural
agriculturally-focused region falling mostly outside of
the commutersheds of the job-growth areas of New
Jersey.
Definitional
Framework
W
e have partitioned New Jersey into six
regions for statewide analysis and to
highlight the emerging Wealth Belt.  These divisions
are a working set of spatial delineations that attempt
to isolate the increasingly complex economic and
social profile of the state. Alternative configurations
are possible, but we believe this partition is informa-
tive in terms of characterizing the economic and
demographic forces at work in New Jersey during this
trans-millennial period. Following is a brief descrip-
tion of each region.
Mature Core Metropolis consists of Bergen, Essex,
Hudson, Passaic, and Union counties.  This region
encompasses the older industrial heartland of New
Jersey and its allied suburbs, which experienced
some of the state’s earliest and most explosive
suburban growth in the post-World War II years.
The region also contains part of the core of the
Map of New Jersey
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Table 1
Wealth Belt versus Mature Core Metropolis:
Summary Measures
(In percentages and current dollars)
Barometers of
Change
equalized valuation and per capita personal income—
the Wealth Belt has surpassed the Core.  A more
detailed evaluation of this transformation follows.
Real Property Wealth: Equalized
Valuation
Equalized valuation represents the market value
of real estate property (land and improvements).
Thus, it provides a measurable base of real property
wealth for geographic areas.  Table 2 presents the
equalized valuation totals for the six regional
partitions and their component counties for 1969
and 1998, as well as their relative statewide shares
(percent distribution).
In 1969, the Mature Core Metropolis accounted
for 50.4 percent ($25.1 billion) of New Jersey’s total
equalized property valuation ($49.8 billion), thus
able 1 provides  a summary glimpse of the
surging Wealth Belt compared to the Core
Metropolis.  In all measures of size and economic
scale—total equalized valuation, total personal
income, total employment, and total population—
the Wealth Belt’s share of statewide total has
expanded markedly between 1969 and the late
1990s; correspondingly, shares held by the Core
Metropolis have eroded significantly. While still
the largest regional economy, the once command-
ing presence of the Core Metropolis is now
history.  Moreover, when individual measures of
wealth and affluence are viewed—per capita
T
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 8
Mature Core Metropolis 50.4% 36.6% $7,961 $60,346
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 29.3% 36.3% $5,791 $75,639
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7
Mature Core Metropolis 51.2% 40.2% $4,811 $33,423
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 28.1% 35.0% $4,598 $36,733
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7 1 9 7 0 1 9 9 8
  
Mature Core Metropolis 53.7% 40.0% 48.0% 38.8%
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 25.3% 34.8% 27.9% 31.0%
Total Employment Total Population
Share of State Share of State
Total Personal Income Per Capita
Share of State Personal Income
Total Equalized Valuation Per Capita
Share of State Equalized Valuation
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Table 2
Equalized Real Property Valuation and Percentage Distribution
New Jersey Regions and Counties:  1969 - 1998
(In thousands of current dollars)
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 8
  
NEW JERSEY TOTAL $49,806,701 $517,375,526 100.0% 100.0%
M a t ure Core M etropolis 25,094,935 189,234,852 50.4 36.6
  
ESSEX 5,679,364 36,945,987 11.4 7.1
HUDSON 3,125,832 19,968,190 6.3 3.9
UNION 4,659,417 31,776,040 9.4 6.1
BERGEN 8,467,342 77,168,476 17.0 14.9
PASSAIC 3,162,979 23,376,159 6.4 4.5
Northern Exurban Fringe 1,104,749 14,367,192 2.2 2.8
SUSSEX 659,659 8,626,202 1.3 1.7
WARREN 445,090 5,740,990 0.9 1.1
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 14,572,661 188,017,296 29.3 36.3
HUNTERDON 603,600 10,532,407 1.2 2.0
MERCER 1,764,185 19,722,535 3.5 3.8
MIDDLESEX 4,100,573 44,053,529 8.2 8.5
MONMOUTH 3,105,472 43,530,931 6.2 8.4
MORRIS 3,313,941 44,101,389 6.7 8.5
SOMERSET 1,684,890 26,076,505 3.4 5.0
M e t ro South 4,529,406 52,975,660 9.1 10.2
CAMDEN 2,186,888 19,674,037 4.4 3.8
BURLINGTON 1,492,120 21,040,783 3.0 4.1
GLOUCESTER 850,399 12,260,840 1.7 2.4
Southern Shore 3,703,839 65,329,187 7.4 12.6
ATLANTIC 1,094,519 18,336,927 2.2 3.5
CAPE MAY 806,692 13,877,515 1.6 2.7
OCEAN 1,802,628 33,114,745 3.6 6.4
Rural South 801,111 7,451,338 1.6 1.4
CUMBERLAND 521,422 4,501,503 1.0 0.9
SALEM 279,689 2,949,835 0.6 0.6
Note:     Equalized Valuation as of October 1, 1998
Source:  New Jersey Division of Taxation
Percent Distribution
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indicating the enormous concentration of real
property assets in the state’s northeastern quadrant
closest to New York City.  In contrast, New Jersey’s
Wealth Belt at that time accounted for only 29.3
percent ($14.6 billion).
By 1998, the state’s total equalized valuation
soared to more than one-half trillion dollars ($517
billion), a ten-fold increase over the 29-year period!
However, there was a marked change in its geo-
graphic distribution. New Jersey’s Wealth Belt
gained virtual parity ($188 billion) with the Core
Metropolis ($189 billion), as both now command a
statewide share of 36 percent.  While Bergen
County maintained its state-leading position ($77
billion), its statewide valuation share fell from 17.0
percent to 14.9 percent.  The Wealth Belt had the
next three highest-ranking counties—Morris,
Middlesex, and Monmouth—each accounting for
about 8.5 percent of total state valuation.
Equally impressive in terms of valuation growth
has been the Southern Shore region, whose state-
wide share increased from 7.4 percent in 1969 to
12.6 percent in 1998.  This represents the impact of
casino gaming and the growth of retirement
complexes and resort housing, but it also represents
links to the Wealth Belt.  Ocean County
encompasses many bedroom communities whose
residents work in the Wealth Belt, and all three
counties provide vacation dwellings for Wealth Belt
residents.
Equalized Valuation Per Capita
The amount of real property valuation per person
is another measure revealing affluence and wealth
position.  In 1969, as shown in Table 3, the equal-
ized per capita valuation in New Jersey’s Wealth
Belt ($5,791) was considerably below that of the
Mature Core Metropolis ($7,961).   By 1998, the
valuation per capita in the Wealth Belt ($75,639)
had soared past that of the Core Metropolis
($60,346) and stood 17 percent above the statewide
average ($64,248). 1
Thus, as the last decade of the century comes to
a close, New Jersey’s Wealth Belt stands preeminent
in property wealth per person. It includes the
second- (Morris), third- (Somerset), and fifth-
(Hunterdon) ranking counties in the state.  While
Bergen County ranks fourth—down from second in
1969—there was a decline in the ranking of every
county in the Core Metropolis between 1969 and
1998.
Total Personal Income
Total personal income—the income received by
all persons in an area from all sources—serves as a
barometer of broad market potency (Table 4).  In
1997, New Jersey’s Wealth Belt accounted for more
than one-third (35.0 percent or $91.4 billion) of
the state’s total personal income ($260.7 billion).
This income share (35.0 percent) is slightly lower
than the region’s share (36.3 percent) of total
equalized valuation, but the long-term trend line is
identical—the gain in Wealth Belt income share and
decline in Core Metropolis income share (from
51.2 percent to 40.2 percent) over time mirrors
that of equalized valuation.
The overall patterns of change of total personal
income in each region and county between 1969
and 1997 are also detailed in Table 4.  While the
Wealth Belt did not achieve parity with the Core
Metropolis by 1997—35.0 percent of total New
Jersey personal income versus 40.2 percent,
respectively—the gap narrowed significantly from
1969, when the Core Metropolis’s share (51.2
percent) was almost double that (28.1 percent) of
the Wealth Belt.  Between 1969 and 1997, each of
the six counties comprising the Wealth Belt
1The Southern Shore region, particularly number-one
ranking Cape May County, represents a special situation.
The valuation per capita calculation produces exaggerated
results in seasonal areas since the valuation of seasonal
housing is included in the numerator, but only year-round
residents are included in the denominator. This yields
misleadingly high numbers.
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1 9 6 9 1 9 9 8 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 8
NEW JERSEY TOTAL $6,138 $64,248
M a t ure Core M etropolis 7,961 60,346
ESSEX 6,138 49,206 13 16
HUDSON 5,112 36,210 16 20
UNION 8,656 63,788 7 9
BERGEN 9,474 90,643 2 4
PASSAIC 6,862 48,293 11 17
Northern Exurban Fringe 4,572 59,776
SUSSEX 8,753 60,724 6 11
WARREN 6,117 58,407 14 13
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 5,791 75,639
HUNTERDON 8,799 87,349 5 5
MERCER 5,769 59,804 15 12
MIDDLESEX 7,157 62,212 9 10
MONMOUTH 6,886 73,008 10 7
MORRIS 8,801 97,107 4 2
SOMERSET 8,638 94,198 8 3
M e t ro South 3,860 45,333
CAMDEN 4,848 38,990 18 19
BURLINGTON 4,765 50,345 19 14
GLOUCESTER 5,000 49,827 17 15
Southern Shore 4,484 80,118
ATLANTIC 6,269 77,512 12 6
CAPE MAY 13,673 141,427 1 1
OCEAN 9,049 68,886 3 8
 
Rural South 3,903 36,006
CUMBERLAND 4,319 31,947 21 21
SALEM 4,711 44,667 20 18
  
Note:     Based on 1998 Equalized Valuation  as of October 1, 1998;  Population estimates from July 1, 1997
Source:  New Jersey Division of Taxation 
Rank in State
Table 3
Per Capita Equalized Valuation of Local Property, and Interperiod Change
New Jersey Counties:  1969 - 1998
(In current dollars)
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Table 4
Total Personal Income by Region and County:  1969 and 1997
(In thousands of current dollars)
 
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7
 
NEW JERSEY TOTAL $32,201,247 $260,736,000 100.0% 100.0%
M a t ure Core M etropolis 16,499,673 104,921,000 51.2 40.2
ESSEX 4,339,427 24,464,000 13.5 9.4
HUDSON 2,406,430 13,831,000 7.5 5.3
UNION 2,813,513 17,515,000 8.7 6.7
BERGEN 4,913,503 36,760,000 15.3 14.1
PASSAIC 2,026,800 12,351,000 6.3 4.7
Northern Exurban Fringe 590,568 6,611,000 1.8 2.5
SUSSEX 309,944 3,995,000 1.0 1.5
WARREN 280,624 2,616,000 0.9 1.0
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 9,058,680 91,357,000 28.1 35.0
HUNTERDON 320,517 4,802,000 1.0 1.8
MERCER 1,358,763 12,070,000 4.2 4.6
MIDDLESEX 2,501,518 21,889,000 7.8 8.4
MONMOUTH 1,971,457 20,269,000 6.1 7.8
MORRIS 1,892,930 19,503,000 5.9 7.5
SOMERSET 1,013,495 12,824,000 3.1 4.9
M e t ro South 3,688,304 31,017,000 11.5 11.9
CAMDEN 1,815,031 13,377,000 5.6 5.1
BURLINGTON 1,239,967 11,653,000 3.9 4.5
GLOUCESTER 633,306 5,987,000 2.0 2.3
Southern Shore 1,684,845 22,133,000 5.2 8.5
ATLANTIC 690,957 7,134,000 2.1 2.7
CAPE MAY 231,177 2,588,000 0.7 1.0
OCEAN 762,711 12,411,000 2.4 4.8
Rural South 679,177 4,696,000 2.1 1.8
CUMBERLAND 441,250 3,054,000 1.4 1.2
SALEM 237,927 1,642,000 0.7 0.6
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis
Percent Distribution
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increased their statewide share; each of the five
counties comprising the Core Metropolis experi-
enced share decreases.  The Wealth Belt is on a
trajectory to achieve total personal income parity
with the Core Metropolis early in the new millen-
nium.
Per Capita Personal Income
By the 1990s, New Jersey’s Wealth Belt already
stood preeminent in per capita income, a measure
of individual spending power and personal
economic capacity in a geographic area (Table 5).
This was a dramatic shift from the late 1960s.  In
1969, the per capita income of the Core Metropo-
lis—still the regional leader—was 106 percent of
the New Jersey average (i.e., 6 percent higher).
While the Wealth Belt had the second highest per
capita income among the six regions, it was only
101.3 percent of the statewide average (i.e., 1.3
percent higher), and far below that of the Core.
By 1997, these positions had been fully
reversed;  the Wealth Belt’s $36,733 per capita
income was 113.5 percent of the $32,356 state-
wide average (up from 101.3 percent in 1969),
compared to 103.3 percent for the Core Metropo-
lis (down from 106 percent in 1969).  All six
counties of the Wealth Belt improved their
statewide per capita personal income ranking
between 1969 and 1997, with Somerset ($46,392
or 143.4 percent of the state average) and Morris
($42,913 or 132.6 percent) now ranked first and
third. In contrast, all five counties of the Core
Metropolis experienced a loss in statewide rank,
with Bergen falling from first to second.
Thus, the changes in per capita personal income
are essentially similar to those of equalized
valuation per capita.  They show an emerging
Wealth Belt already dominating the state and
steadily increasing its commanding position in
individual economic capacity.
Total Employment
Total employment—the number of jobs located
in a geographic area—is a key indicator of the
scale of an area’s economic base.  In 1969, the
Wealth Belt’s 773,856 jobs represented only a
quarter (25.3 percent) of the state’s 3.1 million
jobs (Table 6).  In contrast, the Mature Core
Metropolis’s 1.6 million jobs accounted for more
than half (53.7 percent)—a share more than
double that of the Wealth Belt.  Thus, the New
Jersey economy was highly concentrated in the
northeast core region of the state.  By 1997,
employment in the Wealth Belt nearly doubled.
It gained more than one-half million jobs (to a
total of over 1.3 million) and it increased its
statewide share from one-quarter to more than
one-third (34.8 percent).  At the same time, the
Core Metropolis’s share fell from 53.7 percent to
40.0 percent with the loss of over 100,000 jobs.
However,  Bergen County experienced a gain in
its statewide share, the only county in the Core to
do so, and maintained its state-leading employ-
ment position.  But every county in the Wealth
Belt also increased its share of the state’s total
employment base.
Population
Table 7 details New Jersey’s total population
shifts by region and county between 1970 and
1998.  Massive and sustained suburbanization
and exurbanization of the state’s populace is the
key spatial demographic reality.  During this
period, the state’s population increased by nearly
one million (943,899) persons.  More than one-
half (515,141 persons) of this growth was
captured by the Wealth Belt.  By 1998, nearly
one-out-of-three (31.0 percent) New Jerseyans
were Wealth Belt residents, up from 27.9 percent
in 1970.  Concurrently, the Mature Core
Metropolis’s share of the state’s population fell
from nearly half (48.0 percent) to 38.8 percent.
The Wealth Belt demonstrated substantial
population growth (25.7 percent) between 1970
and 1998, led by Hunterdon County (75.6
percent).  In contrast, the Core Metropolis
exhibited significant population losses (-8.4
percent), led by Essex County (-19.5 percent).
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Table 5
Per Capita Personal Income by Geographic Location:  1969 and 1997
(In current dollars)
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7
NEW JERSEY TOTAL $4,539 $32,356 100.0% 100.0%
M a t ure Core M etropolis 4,811 33,423 106.0 103.3
ESSEX 4,690 32,581 103.3 100.7 5 8
HUDSON 3,936 24,943 86.7 77.1 16 19
UNION 5,227 35,157 115.2 108.7 2 6
BERGEN 5,498 43,123 121.1 133.3 1 2
PASSAIC 4,397 25,560 96.9 79.0 8 17
Northern Exurban Fringe 3,987 27,559 87.8 85.2
SUSSEX 4,112 28,162 90.6 87.0 11 11
WARREN 3,857 26,687 85.0 82.5 18 13
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 4,598 36,733 101.3 113.5
HUNTERDON 4,672 39,830 102.9 123.1 6 4
MERCER 4,443 36,598 97.9 113.1 7 5
MIDDLESEX 4,366 30,881 96.2 95.4 10 9
MONMOUTH 4,372 33,952 96.3 104.9 9 7
MORRIS 5,027 42,913 110.8 132.6 4 3
SOMERSET 5,196 46,392 114.5 143.4 3 1
M e t ro South 3,947 26,528 87.0 82.0
CAMDEN 4,023 26,500 88.6 81.9 12 14
BURLINGTON 3,960 27,849 87.3 86.1 14 12
GLOUCESTER 3,723 24,340 82.0 75.2 20 20
Southern Shore 3,893 27,099 85.8 83.8
ATLANTIC 3,957 30,187 87.2 93.3 15 10
CAPE MAY 3,918 26,419 86.3 81.7 17 15
OCEAN 3,829 25,725 84.4 79.5 19 16
Rural South 3,771 22,770 83.1 70.4
CUMBERLAND 3,655 21,663 80.5 67.0 21 21
SALEM 4,008 25,162 88.3 77.8 13 18
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis
County: Percent of State Rank in State
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Table 6
Total Employment by Geographic Location:  1969 and 1997
1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 9 7  
   
NEW JERSEY TOTAL 3,061,488 3,837,726 100.0% 100.0%
M a t ure Core M etropolis 1,642,769 1,535,253 53.7 40.0
ESSEX 484,560 384,783 15.8 10.0
HUDSON 289,044 249,533 9.4 6.5
UNION 289,018 244,839 9.4 6.4
BERGEN 370,076 468,063 12.1 12.2
PASSAIC 210,071 188,035 6.9 4.9
Northern Exurban Fringe 51,292 71,582 1.7 1.9
SUSSEX 20,242 35,959 0.7 0.9
WARREN 31,050 35,623 1.0 0.9
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 773,856 1,336,336 25.3 34.8
HUNTERDON 23,772 46,107 0.8 1.2
MERCER 149,855 200,724 4.9 5.2
MIDDLESEX 227,944 401,960 7.4 10.5
MONMOUTH 157,648 242,418 5.1 6.3
MORRIS 141,113 271,990 4.6 7.1
SOMERSET 73,524 173,137 2.4 4.5
M e t ro South 350,145 487,414 11.4 12.7
CAMDEN 166,475 213,657 5.4 5.6
BURLINGTON 137,297 185,102 4.5 4.8
GLOUCESTER 46,373 88,655 1.5 2.3
Southern Shore 158,431 323,995 5.2 8.4
ATLANTIC 78,420 148,882 2.6 3.9
CAPE MAY 24,006 40,437 0.8 1.1
OCEAN 56,005 134,676 1.8 3.5
Rural South 84,995 83,146 2.8 2.2
CUMBERLAND 57,679 59,643 1.9 1.6
SALEM 27,316 23,503 0.9 0.6
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis
Percent Distribution
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Table 7
Total Population by Region and County:  1970 and 1998
1 9 7 0 1 9 9 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 9 8       number percent
  
NEW JERSEY TOTAL 7,171,112 8,115,011 100.0% 100.0% 943,899 13.2%
M a t ure Core M etropolis 3,441,411 3,152,306 48.0 38.8 (289,105) -8.4
ESSEX 932,526 750,273 13.0 9.2 (182,253) -19.5
HUDSON 607,839 557,159 8.5 6.9 (50,680) -8.3
UNION 543,116 500,608 7.6 6.2 (42,508) -7.8
BERGEN 897,148 858,529 12.5 10.6 (38,619) -4.3
PASSAIC 460,782 485,737 6.4 6.0 24,955 5.4
Northern Exurban Fringe 151,488 241,630 2.1 3.0 90,142 59.5
SUSSEX 77,528 143,030 1.1 1.8 65,502 84.5
WARREN 73,960 98,600 1.0 1.2 24,640 33.3
New Jersey's Wealth Belt 2,001,322 2,516,463 27.9 31.0 515,141 25.7
HUNTERDON 69,718 122,428 1.0 1.5 52,710 75.6
MERCER 304,116 331,629 4.2 4.1 27,513 9.0
MIDDLESEX 583,813 716,176 8.1 8.8 132,363 22.7
MONMOUTH 461,849 603,434 6.4 7.4 141,585 30.7
MORRIS 383,454 459,896 5.3 5.7 76,442 19.9
SOMERSET 198,372 282,900 2.8 3.5 84,528 42.6
M e t ro South 952,104 1,173,424 13.3 14.5 221,320 23.2
CAMDEN 456,291 505,204 6.4 6.2 48,913 10.7
BURLINGTON 323,132 420,323 4.5 5.2 97,191 30.1
GLOUCESTER 172,681 247,897 2.4 3.1 75,216 43.6
Southern Shore 443,067 825,935 6.2 10.2 382,868 86.4
ATLANTIC 175,043 238,047 2.4 2.9 63,004 36.0
CAPE MAY 59,554 98,069 0.8 1.2 38,515 64.7
OCEAN 208,470 489,819 2.9 6.0 281,349 135.0
Rural South 181,720 205,253 2.5 2.5 23,533 13.0
CUMBERLAND 121,374 140,341 1.7 1.7 18,967 15.6
SALEM 60,346 64,912 0.8 0.8 4,566 7.6
Note:       1998 Estimates as of July 1st
Sources:  U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing and New Jersey State Data Center    
Percent Distribution Change:  1970-1 9 9 8
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New Jersey’s
Historical Economic
Record
pivotal points that benchmark the key stages of
development of New Jersey are briefly discussed
below.
Rural New Jersey: 1790 to 1800
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, New
Jersey comprised a rural society, with a marked
absence of population centers comparable to the great
urban concentrations of Europe.  Dispersed rural
populations surrounding small towns and villages
defined the state’s development pattern.  The villages
and towns were nascent trade centers predicated to a
large degree on agricultural and mining (iron) func-
tions, water power for mills and early textile process-
ing, as well as mercantile activities. The forces leading
to their evolution, then, were trade, agricultural, water
power and/or transportation requirements.  These
towns and villages were situated in reference to the
primary shipping modes— water transportation and
early road networks—as well as to sources of water
power.  They were often rudimentary seaports located
on the Hudson or Delaware Rivers, or rivers flowing
into them. Clearly, the origins of present-day cities
such as Trenton, Camden, Perth Amboy, New
Brunswick, Elizabeth, and Newark can be traced to
their emergence during this period.
Many of the transportation linkages were geared to
New York City and Philadelphia, even though the
latter were still in a relatively early state of develop-
ment.  It was during this time that the New York City-
Philadelphia axis developed, a corridor within which
much of New Jersey’s population would be oriented.
Many of the early settlements located there were
destined to evolve into the major cities of the Civil
War era, and would eventually provide the framework
for the network of railroads which emerged in mid-
century. Thus, the initial foundations of industrial
urban New Jersey were set during this period.
The Rise of the Industrial City:
1850 to 1870
By 1850, New Jersey began to experience the
effects of the emerging industrial era and its physical
expression was the rise of the industrial city. The
reinvented by one-half century of large-scale residen-
tial suburbanization, by four decades of large-scale
retail decentralization, and by two decades of large-
scale office and service-industry deconcentration. 2
Thus, the emergent Wealth Belt is the end product of a
long trajectory of postwar geographic dispersion.
Moreover, it is the latest phase of an even longer
historical record of spatial reorganizations.
The history of New Jersey during the past two
centuries has been characterized by continuous
geographic movements and the emergence of new
spatial concentrations and deconcentrations of people
and economic activity.  This evolution has been
spurred by technological and economic change, along
with demographic and social shifts.   We have moved
from dispersed small early nineteenth-century
settlements based on water power and agriculture, to
highly concentrated early twentieth-century urban-
industrial nodes predicated on steam power and
railroads, to a vast early twenty-first century Wealth
Belt tied to an information-age economy.  The historic
he demographic and economic geography of
end-of-millennium New Jersey has beenT
2Multiple dimensions of suburbanization have occurred
simultaneously in New Jersey.  Within the state, there have
been outward flows from older urban centers such as
Camden and Newark into the surrounding territories.
Superimposed on this pattern has been the outward flows
from New York City and Philadelphia into suburban New
Jersey. Moreover, while there is a historic flow of new
immigrant groups into New Jersey’s urban areas, as well as
into New York City and Philadelphia, suburban New Jersey
has also become a direct destination for large numbers of
new immigrants.  Thus, the overall process of
suburbanization in New Jersey is complex.
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successive developments of the canal and railroad
systems and the emergence of the industrial use of steam
power became important centralizing forces drawing
populations to urban areas—the focal points of the
industrial economy.  The cities’ populations—fed by
rural-to-urban and international migrations—
massed around emerging factory structures, and
were dependent on close pedestrian linkages.  A
tight, dense, interdependent urban complex evolved,
with residences closely linked to workplaces, and
service facilities clustering near their residential
markets.  The urban way of life began to secure
critical mass in New Jersey.
Early Metropolitanization:
1920 to 1940
By 1920, a new spatial pattern had emerged: the
early industrial metropolis. This evolutionary stage
was given impetus by the growth and connection of
electric power systems and the internal combustion
engine.  The cities, now crowded to the bursting
point, spilled their boundaries and began to en-
compass adjacent political units. The city was still
the dominant sector of New Jersey society, but a
host of contiguous territories became a functional
part of the daily urban economic system.  Residen-
tial clusters developed outside the city but were
closely dependent upon it for most economic and
social functions. Thus, the rise of the metropolis
was a consequence of the continued dominance of
the urban economy as well as the development of
outlying suburban residential communities.
The earliest suburbs, which developed at the end
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were
of a highly disciplined nature. Constrained by
transportation technology, they were intimately tied
to streetcar systems and early commuter rail lines.
Hence, suburban development took a clustered form
about commuter stations.  Their spatial spread was
often limited by feasible walking distances.  Perhaps
better described as suburban villages, they estab-
lished the image of suburbia that persists to the
present day.
However, during the 1920s, suburbanization was
also linked to the private automobile and the early
development of the state’s highway system.  From
1920 to 1930 car ownership grew markedly and
opened more suburban territory for development.
The automobile overrode the constraining forces
that disciplined the pattern of early suburbs, and
enabled economic and residential growth to spread
indiscriminately.  Urban and suburban sprawl was
thus initiated during this period, although the city
remained the central element for the day-to-day
activities of most of our urban and suburban
populations.
Post-War Suburbanization—Decline of
the City: 1950 to 1970
The forces of suburbanization, held in check by
the Depression and World War II, immediately
reasserted themselves at the end of the decade of
the 1940s.  The workforce demanded, and was now
able to afford, new housing as a consequence of the
high rate of household formation, strong economic
growth, and the home-loan provisions of the GI Bill.
This was the era of tract house suburban New
Jersey.  Approximately 1,000 housing units per
week were added to New Jersey’s shelter inven-
tory—a pace sustained for more than 1,000 straight
weeks!  Thus, New Jersey gained approximately one
million housing units over a twenty-year period.
The great majority were “Levittown-style” units
filling suburban jurisdictions of counties that
contained the state’s major cities—such as Essex
and Union counties.  This vast physical transforma-
tion was facilitated by unprecedented levels of
automobile ownership, the opening of the state’s toll
roads, and the initial stages of construction of the
Interstate Highway System.
Throughout this period, the New Jersey city
increasingly faced a crisis of function —activities
once the sole province of the central city became
dispersed throughout the metropolis. Electronics,
oil, petrochemicals, aviation, and mass production
changed the profile of the state’s industrial base.
The increasing reliance on trucking and highways
and single-story manufacturing structures rendered
obsolete many dimensions of the dense physical
structure of urban New Jersey.
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Edge City New Jersey and the
Emergence of the Wealth Belt:
1980 to 2000
All of the patterns that emerged in the preceding
period reached a new crescendo in the final two
decades of the century.  New Jersey’s manufacturing
economy peaked in 1969; a sustained hemorrhage of
manufacturing jobs and a sustained diminution in its
relative economic importance then ensued.  The old
industrial base of the state’s cities virtually disap-
peared after the Vietnam War.
The new economy that emerged has several
dimensions. Spatially, all of the economic functions
once solely the province of the central cities—
workplace, residence place, shopping place, health
place, cultural place, and recreation place—became
dispersed through the metropolis.  The completion of
the Interstate Highway System in New Jersey and
vastly expanded toll roads defined the spatial corridors
of economic expansion.
By the end of the 1980s, close to 30 enclosed
super-regional shopping malls had been erected—the
new regional mall grid came to dominate New Jersey’s
retailing. The state’s cities were the clear-cut losers—
regional malls the clear-cut victors—in the regional
retail wars.   During the 1990s, the “malling” of New
Jersey was replaced by the “big boxing” of New Jersey,
as new retailing formats proliferated throughout the
suburban arena.
The signature spatial event of this period was the
emergence of the freeway-oriented suburban-growth
corridor during the 1980s.  Over 80 percent of all the
office space ever built in the history of New Jersey by
1990 went up in the 1980s.  In ten years we built a
twenty-year supply of space, as the state experienced
the greatest level of economic deconcentration in
history.
The initial economic force was the emergence of
the first-generation post-industrial economy. Massive
growth in service, finance, and other white-collar
corporate employment, mostly sheltered in the new
massive suburban office inventory, defined the decade
of the 1980s. While this first-generation post-
industrial economy was not particularly efficient,
principally because productivity advances were
hindered by struggles to successfully incorporate
computerization and information technology, its
spatial impacts were dramatic.
In the 1990s, the second generation post-
industrial era emerged—a much more efficient and
productive knowledge-dependent, information-age
economy.  This era was, and is being driven by
globalization, deregulation, sustained innovation, and
the rise to dominance of information technology. Key
end-of-century forces and economic sectors include
semiconductors, software, fiber optics, digital networks,
the internet, genetics, and new media—a far cry from
the steam, rail, and heavy production paradigm that
underpinned the rise of New Jersey’s industrial
cities.
T he emergence of the Wealth Belt is linked toanother phenomenon: living large in New
Jersey or the giganticizing of New Jersey.  Except in
the aftermath of the energy crises of the 1970s, bigger
has always been better in the United States, but big is
now getting really big!  Housing stands as the prime
example.  The original suburban house of Levittown—
the Levitt Cape Cod—was a 900-square-foot tribute
to modesty.  We are now producing amenity-laden
finished machines for living that are at least two and
one-half times as large—big and lush.  In 1998, the
average size for a new house in the Northeast region
of the United States was approaching 2,300 square
feet. In the large lot subdivisions of New Jersey’s
Wealth Belt, the modular size is easily 3,600 square
feet—and the new “Starter Castles” are far larger.
In addition, one out of three New Jerseyans is a
maturing baby boomer in the child-rearing stage of the
family life cycle.  Never before in history have we had
such a disproportionate share of the state’s population
in the age span where productivity, earnings, and
incomes peak.  With the new information-age
economy finally generating substantial income gains in
the context of low interest rates, the ability to pur-
Living Large in
New Jersey
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chase ever-larger single-family units is at unprec-
edented levels.  Between 1960 and 1990, less than 60
percent of housing units authorized by building permit
in the state were single family units. In the 1990s,
over 85 percent of building permits have been single
family, representing an all-time record share of
market. In addition, the 1990s’ single family units are
far larger, with ever-greater amenity packages.
Motor vehicles stand as a second example of
giganticizing.  During the current decade, baby
boomers have moved from Hondas to SUVs (sport
utility vehicles)—a move perhaps in parallel to their
maturing derrieres.  Now they are moving from SUVs
to SAVs  (suburban assault vehicles)—from two-ton
Ford Explorers to two-and-one-half-ton Ford Expedi-
tions to three-ton Ford Excursions.  This move may
represent an attempt to subdue increasingly congested
roads through sheer size and strength.  Such big
vehicles and wheels—public enemy number one to
energy conservation—parked in the three-car garages
of the Wealth Belt’s McMansions may represent a new
obsession with abundance.  Whether due to a stock-
market-inspired wealth effect, real income gains, or a
near-record-length economic expansion, there may be
limits to large. Large homes, large cars, and large
commutes, the products of individual consumer
decisions, produce sprawl and congestion that impose
costs in time and dollars and threaten the very sources
of these individual decisions—the economy’s strong
performance.
Suburban and
Exurban Crawl:
Success, Size, and
Congestion
system.  The suburban and exurban sprawl of the past
two decades has now fully yielded suburban and
exurban crawl.  Chronic sustained creeping congestion
has become the bucolic nightmare—the Wealth-Belt/
edge-city nightmare.  The new congestion scene—the
frontier of congestion—comprises overloaded net-
works of early- to mid-twentieth century two-lane local
and county roads crammed with end-of-century baby-
boom commuters in their SAVs.  Because of totally
dispersed trip origins and trip destinations, the new
congestion appears to be an intractable problem since
there is no other realistic option to private vehicles on
the Wealth Belt’s exuburban periphery.  Thus, it is a
far more difficult problem to untangle than old-
fashioned highway or freeway backups, and it is a
congestion problem that is probably increasing much
faster than is congestion on our freeway nets.  The
congestion cycle keeps moving outward, spurred by
living large in New Jersey and relentless economic and
residential decentralization to the next greenfield. Are
we stretching the Wealth Belt close to the breaking
point?
New Millennium
Demographics
he baby boom’s national pastime was postpon-
ing middle age.  But middle age landed with aT
T he new information-age economy could also belabeled the “speed-of-light economy”—an era
driven by the impact of information flowing through
fiber optic cables at the speed of light. But the
evolution to a light-speed economy has been paralleled
by the evolution to a snail-speed transportation
vengeance as the 1990s matured.  As the thundering
baby-boom herd stampedes into the new millennium,
advanced middle age cannot be avoided.  As their
children fly from the parental nest, baby boomers will
increasingly become empty nesters and a new housing
era will emerge in New Jersey and America: the era of
“empty-nesterhood.”   Rattling around in their
McMansions—among the most deeply feathered nests
in history—post-middle-age baby boomers will begin
to make new housing choices, with “trading up”
succumbing to “resizing.”  While this new housing
future has not yet been fully invented, it may well
portend more compact communities and/or spatial
shifts to areas of concentrated entertainment, cultural,
and recreational facilities—or to areas easily accessible
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to them.  Wealth-Belt sprawl may finally attenuate due
to demographic dynamics, but this future is certainly
not assured.
continue to seek to replicate the style and scale of
living characterized by the residential and spatial
patterns of the Wealth Belt, promises, in turn, more
congestion, environmental problems, and public sector
pressures.
Incentives for Investment
At some point in this cycle, public policy and
individual choices are affected. First, public policy, in
response to the incessant costs of sprawl, has at-
tempted through such actions as the State Develop-
ment and Redevelopment Plan and the eventual
renewal of the Transportation Trust Fund to shift
public investments and hence, via the cost incentives
such investment creates for buyers, builders, and
municipalities, to channel growth back to urban areas
and towns.   Second, as the self-imposed costs of the
Wealth Belt’s success continue, the relative costs of
housing, time, and convenience change in favor of
individual and business choices for more concentrated
residential and business patterns.
As a result of over 100 months of sustained
national economic growth and the swing in relative
location costs, New Jersey’s cities are experiencing a
recovery of private-sector investment and economic
development.   This is most apparent along the
Hudson waterfront from Fort Lee south to Liberty
State Park spanning the towns of Edgewater, West
New York, Weehawken, Hoboken, and Jersey City.  In
addition, Newark is also experiencing private-sector
development on a large and highly visible scale led by
public and private partnerships and focused around
commercial office construction, the New Jersey
Performing Arts Center, higher education and science
and technology linkages, and residential construction.
There are also signs of emerging private investment in
Elizabeth. In all of these areas, the cost equation for
businesses and individuals locating in New York or in
ever further receding suburban New Jersey is moving
in favor of urban New Jersey.   These changes, com-
bined with the demographic future of empty-nest baby
boomers and young professionals focused on conve-
nience and access, have meant that areas of urban
northern New Jersey are once again returning to be
T he surging Wealth-Belt counties represent theleading edge of the end-of-century economic
reality of New Jersey and the metropolitan regions of
which they are a part. The shift of the critical mass of
economic activity, purchasing power, and affluence to
the metropolitan perimeter not only signifies a new
market geography, but also a new political geography.
Infrastructure and Development
However, the national real estate community—not
simply the “greens”—has started to question the long-
term viability of the edge-city economic agglomera-
tions that we have termed suburban growth corridors.
These metropolitan perimeter zones lack true cores
and have virtually no mass transit capacity. Infrastruc-
ture shortfalls abound amid a certain degree of land-
use chaos. Laissez-faire, unrestrained growth markets
are seen as increasing investment risks. Slash and
burn development is being viewed with disfavor; there
is recognition that areas with growth constraints and
limitations yield healthier and more stable investment
markets.  There is no greater risk to land values than
unrestrained development.  New Jersey’s Wealth Belt
is about to confront this reality.
The enormous economic growth of the Wealth Belt
has brought with it increasing congestion with
concomitant significant costs in time and money to
individuals and business.  In addition, air and ground-
water quality deterioration has accompanied the
economic boom of the Wealth Belt along with the
rising and large costs of providing new infrastructure,
schools, and related services in a political environment
that has championed reduction in the role of govern-
ment and the size of the public sector.   The promise
of more growth, driven by individual preferences that
Issues and
Challenges to Spatial
Realignments
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locations of choice as they once were nearly 50 years
ago.  (However, it is interesting to note that some of
the symmetric quality of life issues and related
development costs that are now readily apparent in
the Wealth Belt are beginning to emerge in the very
Hudson waterfront urban municipalities and cities
experiencing the most growth.  These consist of
rising local highway and parking congestion, the
changed character of local neighborhoods, loss of
New York skyline views, and rapidly increasing
infrastructure needs as growth imposes demands on
an aged system of water supply, schools, highways,
and public transit facilities!)
Caveats and Challenges
Several caveats are in order, however, before
declaring the golden renaissance of urban New
Jersey and the stalling of the Wealth Belt growth
engine that has dominated New Jersey economic
development for the past quarter of a century.  First,
the national economic expansion, now in record-
length territory, is showing signs of classic problems
—rising wage costs, slower productivity growth, the
stirring of inflation, and interest rate increases. Any
significant slowdown of the national economy will
inevitably affect New Jersey, and the past record of
the differential effects of national economic slow-
downs on urban vs. suburban New Jersey are clear.
Namely, urban New Jersey has been the first region
to feel the negative effects of national economic
malaise and the last to experience the benefits of
recovery.  It is worth noting that the late 1990s
boom of the Hudson waterfront region was antici-
pated with private investment and development in
the late 1980s only to be devastated by the severity
of the national recession manifested with a ven-
geance in New Jersey.
Second, much of the current urban boom is
focused on the financial industry with spillover
demand for housing and business locations by the
New York financial sector.  The past record of the
cyclical effects of a capital market downturn is one
of severe damage to incomes and employment of
those dependent on this sector.
Finally, the technological and educational impera-
tives of the new economy must be placed in the
context of the spatial attractiveness of both the
Wealth Belt and urban/older suburban New Jersey.
The power of computerization has meant that
distance no longer is a cost deterrent for the spatial
dispersal of many economic activities.   The manifes-
tations of this power are many—instant 24-hour
global communication, the effective management of
inventory, supply and production decisions from a
central place that can be located almost anywhere
and that has the equivalent efficacy of local on-site
control, and vast capabilities to transmit data and
information anywhere, anytime.  Thus, the economic
incentives created by this technology further the
decentralization patterns that, in fact, have been a
major reason behind the dominance of Wealth Belt
development.
The complementary needs for a workforce skilled
and flexible with the tools of this new technology are
ever more vital to the future well-being of our state’s
economy (and that of every other state and nation as
well!). This requires an effective, efficient education
and workforce training system, beginning with K-12
education and extending through life-long learning
opportunities.
The provision of such a system remains the long-
run challenge of urban New Jersey, just as it has been
for over a quarter of a century.  To the extent that
effective education, at all levels, can be found in
urban and old suburban New Jersey, then the full
realization of the economic revival of urban areas can
be reached and the complete benefits of the powerful
economic advantages these areas once offered, and
now offer again, can be realized.  This can occur as
our changing state economy moves beyond its
industrial past into the new century of computeriza-
tion, communication, innovations of fundamental
nature, biotechnology, genetics, and the dominance
of the service sector.
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Baseline for the New Millennium
The Edward J. Bloustein School of Plan-
ning and Public Policy was established in 1992
to provide a focus for all of Rutgers University’s
initiatives and programs of instruction, research, and
service in planning and public policy.  This new
ensemble of resources was created to better address
the most important and vexing issues facing the
people of New Jersey, the nation, and the world
community.  The school is nationally recognized as
one of the premier institutions of its kind, having the
capacity to address local, state, regional, national, and
international policy and planning issues with genuine
expertise and credibility.
The faculty is comprised of researchers and
theorists as well as former government leaders who
work to apply research that promotes positive social
and economic change.  The school’s three academic
departments—public policy, urban planning and
policy development, and urban studies and commu-
nity health—offer a variety of undergraduate,
graduate, and professional degrees. In addition, the
school includes research centers in employment
policy and workforce development, transportation
policy, neighborhood and brownfields redevelop-
ment, government services, and negotiation and
conflict resolution.
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James W. Hughes and Joseph J. Seneca, editors
merica seems beset by the constant need to
react to public policy concerns of the moment.
They cover a wide range of demographic shifts—
“baby booms” and “baby busts,” increasing immigra-
tion, ethnic and racial diversity, the proliferation of
different household configurations, economic upward
mobility that stems from the information-age rather
than the industrial economy, and suburban and
sunbelt gains.
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A
But beneath the surface of many momentary issues
are powerful evolutionary forces whose long-term
public policy effects promise to be much more
significant.  One of the most important of these is the
profound demographic change taking place in
America—change that has extraordinary social and
economic consequences, and far-reaching public
policy implications for the future of the nation.
The editors of this volume have assembled experts
on demography, immigration, policy, and family life to
explain and document both changes and prospects of
changes.  Contributors profile the contours of
demographic change in America and identify select
public policy challenges arising from this change.
